Complex language, complex thought? The relation between children's production of double embeddings and Theory of Mind by Bogaerds-Hazenberg, Suzanne & Hendriks, Petra
  
 University of Groningen
Complex language, complex thought? The relation between children's production of double
embeddings and Theory of Mind
Bogaerds-Hazenberg, Suzanne; Hendriks, Petra
Published in:
Linguistics in the Netherlands
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Final author's version (accepted by publisher, after peer review)
Publication date:
2016
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Bogaerds-Hazenberg, S., & Hendriks, P. (2016). Complex language, complex thought? The relation
between children's production of double embeddings and Theory of Mind. Linguistics in the Netherlands,
33, 28-40.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Complex language, complex thought? The relation between children’s production of 
double embeddings and Theory of Mind 
Suzanne Bogaerds-Hazenberg & Petra Hendriks
University of Groningen
It has been argued (e.g., by De Villiers and colleagues) that the acquisition of sentence 
embedding is necessary for the development of first-order Theory of Mind (ToM): the 
ability to attribute beliefs to others. This raises the question whether the acquisition of 
double embedded sentences is related to, and perhaps even necessary for, the 
development of second-order ToM: the ability to attribute beliefs about beliefs to 
others. This study tested 55 children (aged 7-10) on their ToM understanding in a 
false-belief task and on their elicited production of sentence embeddings. We found 
that second-order ToM passers produced mainly double embeddings, whereas first-
order ToM passers produced mainly single embeddings. Furthermore, a better 
performance on second-order ToM predicted a higher rate of double embeddings and 
a lower rate of single embeddings in the production task. We conclude that children’s 
ability to produce double embeddings is related to their development of second-order 
ToM.
Key words: Language acquisition, false-belief task, sentence embedding, Theory of 
Mind
1. Introduction
Theory of Mind (ToM), or the ability to attribute mental states such as beliefs, desires and 
intentions to oneself and others, develops during childhood. Children gradually learn that 
“people live their lives in a mental world as much as in a world of real situations and 
occurrences” (Wellman, Cross and Watson 2001:656). This enables them to represent other 
people’s thoughts in their own brain, which is needed to predict other people’s behavior. 
A frequently used task to test ToM abilities is a false-belief (FB) task (Wellman, 
Cross and Watson 2001; Wimmer and Perner 1983). In an FB task, the true knowledge of a 
participant is pitted against the false belief of a character in the task, for example a puppet. If 
participants are able to attribute a false belief, contrasting with their own true belief, to the 
puppet and predict its behavior accordingly, participants are said to possess a first-order 
ToM. People possess a second-order ToM if they are able to attribute a belief about a belief 
(that is, a second-order belief) to someone else. 
Many studies found strong correlations between first-order FB reasoning and a wide 
variety of linguistic tasks, suggesting that ToM development and language acquisition are 
fundamentally related and interdependent (Astington and Baird 2005). Some researchers 
claim that language acquisition is dependent on ToM development, others that there is a 
bidirectional relationship between language acquisition and ToM development (De Mulder 
2011), and yet other researchers argue that particular linguistic knowledge is necessary for 
the development of ToM (De Villiers and Pyers 2002). As many FB tasks are verbal in 
nature, it is conceivable that general language abilities are useful or even necessary to pass an 
FB task. However, De Villiers and Pyers (2002) argue that there is a specific linguistic 
prerequisite for ToM, namely the acquisition of the syntax for embedded complements under 
mental-state verbs. That is, the ability to understand other minds is dependent on the ability to 
understand and produce sentences like the following: 
(1) Mickey thinks that Donald is ill.
This sentence contains the mental-state verb thinks. The sentential complement Donald is ill 
is embedded under this verb. To understand this sentence, a child needs to know the lexical 
meaning of thinks and also needs to understand that the proposition embedded under thinks 
can be true or false, as it reports something in Mickey’s mind and not in reality. The 
embedded structure ‘organizes’ meaning in the mind, and so the acquisition of the language 
of these propositional attitudes would open up a “classification into worlds, or different 
points of view on reality” (Jill de Villiers 2005:188). A child must acquire this complex 
syntactic structure not only for reporting about false beliefs in his language, but also for 
representing in his own mind the belief states of others. A longitudinal study by De Villiers 
and Pyers (2002) found that children’s spontaneous production of sentential complements is a 
precursor of FB understanding. Other studies showed that both oral and signing deaf children 
experiencing specific problems with these sentential complements are also delayed in passing 
(non)verbal FB tasks (Jill de Villiers 2005; Peter de Villiers 2005). Therefore, the mastery of 
this piece of syntax is claimed to be crucial to successful first order FB reasoning: without 
sentential complementation, a child has no means to represent its own beliefs and compare 
them to other people’s beliefs. 
Although this language-first hypothesis has initiated many longitudinal and 
intervention studies on the link between sentence embedding and FB reasoning in various 
populations (Peter de Villiers 2005), few studies separate first-order FB, which typically 
develops around age 3 or 4 (Wimmer and Perner 1983), from second-order FB, which has 
been argued to develop between the ages of 7-9 (Hollebrandse and Van Hout 2015). If it is 
true that the syntax of single embedding is related to, and perhaps even necessary for, 
successful first-order FB reasoning, then it can be hypothesized by the same reasoning that 
the syntax of double embedding (as in (2)) is related to second-order FB reasoning (cf. De 
Villiers, Hobbs and Hollebrandse 2014). 
(2) Daisy thinks that Mickey thinks that Donald is ill.
Only recently, some studies have started to examine whether the language-first hypothesis 
extends to more complex forms of FB reasoning. Their rationale is similar, namely that “the 
recursive linguistic representations involved in syntactic embedding may provide the 
scaffolding to perform the recursive step of a second-order false-belief reasoning” 
(Hollebrandse and Van Hout 2015:104). Although non-ceiling performance was found for 
children between the ages of 6 and 10 on tasks testing their comprehension and production of 
double embeddings as well as on tasks assessing second-order FB understanding 
(Hollebrandse, Hobbs, De Villiers and Roeper 2008; Hollebrandse and Van Hout 2015), 
these studies did not look into the relation between children’s performance on sentence 
embedding and the same children’s performance on FB reasoning, but only analyzed  
children’s performance on the tasks separately . 
Most studies so far used comprehension tasks in which children had to provide an 
answer to a double-embedded question (e.g., What did the policeman say the woman said was 
in her backpack?). A weakness of such a design is that the target response is not only 
dependent on the child’s mastery of double embedding, but also on its mastery of long-
distance dependencies and its ability to deal with both complexities at the same time. Some 
studies used a production task, in which however it sufficed to repeat a previously mentioned 
double embedded sentence or only part of it (e.g., Hollebrandse and Van Hout 2015). None 
of these tasks required the child to construct a complete double embedded sentence. 
Therefore, it is still unclear to what extent children are actually able to represent this 
recursive sentence structure and how this ability relates to their ToM development.  
The current study aims to fill this gap by investigating the relation between the 
construction of double embeddings and second-order FB reasoning. It reports on the results 
of an experiment with Dutch children who were presented with a second-order FB task and a 
novel production task eliciting double embeddings on the basis of visual stimuli. 
2. Methodology
2.1 Participants
55 typically developing Dutch children (27 boys, 28 girls) from two primary schools 
participated in the experiment, with a mean age of 8.8 years old (age range 7;6-10;4). The 
schools provided standardized scores for reading fluency (DMT; a three-minutes word 
reading test) and reading level (AVI; a measure reflecting the text complexity a child can 
handle). The scores on these two reading tasks may provide an (albeit very indirect) measure 
of general language abilities.
2.2 Materials and design
All children received a verbal FB task (the Bake Sale task adapted from Hollebrandse et al. 
2014) and a novel sentence elicitation task eliciting double embeddings.
Bake Sale task – This verbal FB task consists of eight short stories with corresponding 
questions measuring first-order (FB1) and second-order (FB2) false-belief. In all stories, two 
protagonists initially have the same belief, but during the story independently change their 
beliefs, ending up with different beliefs. When the child is asked a question about the belief 
of one protagonist about the belief of the other protagonist, this requires second-order FB 
reasoning. Each story is illustrated by four pictures that focus the child’s attention. None of 
the stories contain syntactic embeddings. The questions only contain single embeddings. 
Sentence Embedding task – This production task elicits double embeddings on the 
basis of pictures. Thus, the task contrasts with the highly verbal task of Hollebrandse et al. 
(2008) (see also Hollebrandse and Van Hout 2015), which required participants to first 
interpret a double embedding in a story and then to reproduce the embedded proposition in 
response to a question. In our task, each picture depicts a character producing a talking cloud 
(or thought bubble) in which another character is embedded producing another talking cloud 
(or thought bubble). The embedded talking cloud is filled with two short phrases, on the basis 
of which a sentence can be produced. Only phrases with an AVI level (a readability level 
based on word frequency and length, SLO 2008) appropriate for 7-year-olds were used. In a 
pretest with 8 adults and 2 children, it was checked that formulating simple sentences on the 
basis of the two phrases did not result in any difficulty. The task consisted of 36 target items 
(pictures targeting double embedding such as x says/thinks that y says/thinks that p), preceded 
by 12 practice items (pictures targeting single embeddings such as x says/thinks that p), as 
illustrated in Figure 1. The practice items were included for instruction and to ensure that the 
children understood the task. The content of the practice item on the left can be verbalized as 
in (3a), whereas the content of the target item on the right can be phrased with a double 
embedding (3b). 
(3) a. Katrien zegt dat Donald naar de slager is.
‘Daisy says that Donald went to the butcher’s.’
b. Mickey denkt dat Katrien zegt dat Donald naar de slager is.
‘Mickey thinks that Daisy says that Donald went to the butcher’s’.
 
Figure 1. Practice item (left) and target item (right) in the Sentence Embedding task
The distribution of characters, talking clouds and thought bubbles was counterbalanced 
across items.
2.3 Procedure
All children were tested individually by the same experimenter in a quiet room at their 
school. Each test session took approximately 35 minutes. The order in which the two tasks 
were conducted was balanced across participants in order to avoid priming effects. Children’s 
responses were audio-taped for later transcription. The children were told that they could stop 
the experiment at any moment. At the end of the test session, the child was given a small 
reward.
The stories of the Bake Sale task were read aloud by the experimenter. At specific 
points during the story, the FB questions were asked. The children were encouraged to 
formulate a response. 
The Sentence Embedding task started with an introductory story, explaining that an 
expensive painting had been stolen and that the task of the child was to help the detective find 
the thief by providing information about what the characters on the pictures said and thought 
about each other. They were instructed to do so in only one sentence. We did not explicitly 
mention that the characters could be lying , but the narrative context suggests this possibility. 
As a result, the embedded complement could be false. De Villiers et al. (2014) argue that 
contrasts in truth value between the matrix clause and the embedded clause may help the 
child in recognizing recursive structures. This could also be true for producing recursive 
structures. 
At the beginning of the task, the experimenter checked whether the names of the three 
characters (Donald, Mickey or Daisy) were familiar to the children and whether the children 
knew that thought bubbles and talking clouds could be verbalized as to think and to say, 
respectively. Then the experiment continued with 12 practice items, which contained only 
single thought bubbles and talking clouds. The experimenter encouraged the child to produce 
syntactic embeddings to verbalize the content of the picture, by occasionally pointing out 
features of the pictures (e.g., “Don’t forget to mention the character” or “Look again, is 
Mickey thinking or saying something?”) or by asking the child to finish the sentence. 
Children who spontaneously used syntactic embeddings were praised. Children who omitted 
information or did not produce syntactic embeddings were told how to phrase the information 
correctly. Next, the task continued with the 36 target items. From this moment on, the 
experimenter no longer corrected the child. The experimenter told the child that the pictures 
would become slightly more difficult, but that the child had done very well and could 
continue to tell what was on the picture, again in one sentence. After each set of twelve target 
items, there was a small break so that the child could relax for a minute and stay  
concentrated. 
2.4 Data analysis of the Sentence Embedding task
As shown in Table 1, the responses on the Sentence Embedding task were transcribed and 
categorized into four categories: (1) Double embedding, (2) Mixed embedding, (3) Single 
embedding and (4) No embedding. Double embedding is the target category and involves a 
proposition embedded under two verbs. Mixed embeddings involve a combination of indirect 
speech and direct speech. Indirect speech requires syntactic embedding of the reported 
proposition, which is marked in Dutch by the complementizer dat (‘that’) and the verb-final 
word order indicative of subordinate clauses. Direct speech, in contrast, does not involve 
syntactic embedding and hence is not introduced by a complementizer and has the verb-
second word order indicative of Dutch main clauses. In single embedded sentences, typically 
one of the two characters on the picture is omitted or the two characters are referred to in a 
DP conjunction. In the case of no embedding, only direct speech is used or sentence 
embedding is avoided in some other way. 




Mickey denkt dat Katrien zegt dat Donald naar de slager is. 
Mickey thinks that Daisy says that Donald went to the butcher’s.
Mixed 
embedding
Mickey denkt dat Katrien zegt: Donald is naar de slager. 
Mickey thinks that Daisy says: Donald went to the butcher’s.
Mickey denkt: Katrien zegt dat Donald naar de slager is. 
Mickey thinks: Daisy says that Donald went to the butcher’s. 
Single 
embedding
Mickey denkt dat Katrien Donald meeneemt naar de slager.
Mickey thinks that Daisy takes Donald to the butcher’s.
Mickey denkt dat Donald/Katrien naar de slager is.
Mickey thinks that Donald/Daisy went to the butcher’s. 
Mickey denkt dat Katrien en Donald naar de slager zijn.
Mickey thinks that Donald and Daisy went to the butcher’s. 
Mickey en Katrien zeggen/denken dat Donald naar de slager is.
Mickey and Daisy say/think that Donald went to the butcher’s.
No 
embedding
Mickey zegt: “Katrien, ga jij naar de slager?” “Nee, maar Donald wel”. 
Mickey says: “Daisy, are you going to the butcher’s?” “No, but Donald is”. 
Mickey (en Katrien/Donald) gaan naar de slager.
Mickey (and Daisy/Donald) go to the butcher’s. 
3. Results
3.1 False-belief reasoning
In total, 92% of the FB1 questions were answered correctly by the 7 to 10-year-old children, 
and 47% of the FB2 questions. We grouped the children according to their performance on 
the Bake Sale task. FB2-passers answered the FB2 and FB1 questions correctly, FB1-passers 
answered the FB1 questions correctly but made too many errors on the FB2 questions, and 
FB-failers made too many errors on both the FB2 and FB1 questions. The threshold for 
passing FB1 was set at answering at least seven out of the eight FB1 questions correctly. 
Likewise, the threshold for passing FB2 was set at answering at least seven out of the eight 
FB2 questions correctly. 12 children (22%) fell into the group of FB2-passers, 37 children 
(67%) were FB1-passers and 6 children (11%) were FB-failers. Table 2 lists these three FB 
groups. The mean age of the participants did not differ significantly across groups. 
Table 2. Distinction of three FB groups on the basis of the children’s performance on the 
Bake Sale task. Per FB group, mean percentage correct on FB1 and FB2 and mean 
chronological age are listed (standard error).
FB2-passers FB1-passers FB-failers Total
FB1 95.8 (2.5) 95.3 (1.0) 62.6 (6.5) 91.8 (1.8)
FB2 91.7 (1.8) 35.8 (4.8) 27.1 (12.3) 47.1 (4.8)
Age 9.2 (0.1) 8.7 (0.1) 8.8 (0.5) 8.8 (0.1)
3.2 Production of double embeddings
Based on performance on the practice items, one child (age 7;6) seemed not to understand the 
task, as this child did not produce any single embeddings on the practice items, in contrast to 
the other children.i The responses of the 55 children on the target items of the Sentence 
Embedding task were categorized according to the four categories discussed in Section 2.4. 
Table 3 presents the produced responses per FB group on this task. 
Table 3. Distribution of responses per FB group (FB2-passers, FB1-passers and FB-failers) in 
mean percentages (standard error) in the Sentence Embedding task
Response type FB2-passers FB1-passers FB-failers Total
Double embedding 57.8 (10.5) 20.0 (5.3) 17.2 (15.4) 29.8 (5.10
Mixed embedding 23.7 (8.5) 13.6 (4.2) 5.7 (5.7) 14.9 (3.4)
Single embedding 18.2 (8.4) 52.8 (7.1) 29.7 (16.4) 42.7 (5.7)
No embedding - 11.0 (4.2) 47.4 (21.2) 12.6 (4.0)
Overall, single embeddings were produced most frequently (43%), followed by the 
targeted double embeddings (30%). There was a differential pattern across the three groups: 
the FB2-passers mainly produced double embeddings (58%), the FB1-passers mainly 
produced single embeddings (53%), and the FB-failers mainly produced non-embeddings 
(47%). Despite this differential pattern, most groups produced all sentence types, although 
the FB2-passers did not produce sentences without embedding. Notably, one participant in 
the group of FB-failers produced double embeddings for 94% of the target items. 
A one-way ANOVA analysis was carried out with FB group as independent variable 
and the mean production of the different response types as dependent variable. Children with 
different levels of FB reasoning performed differently in the production of double 
embeddings (F(2, 54)=5.28, p<.01, η2=0.169). Post-hoc analyses revealed that the FB2-
passers produced significantly more double embeddings than the FB1-passers (p<.01). The 
three groups did not differ in their production of mixed embeddings, but there were 
differences in the production of single embeddings (F(2, 54)=6.17, p<.004, η2=0.192). The 
FB1-passers produced significantly more single embeddings than the FB2-passers (p<.01). 
The groups also differed in their production of sentences without embeddings (F(2, 54)=6.44, 
p<.01, η2=0.198). The FB-failers produced more sentences without embeddings than children 
who mastered first-order FB (p<.001), and also more in comparison to children who mastered 
second-order FB (p<.001). We did not find differences between the four combinations of the 
verbs think and say. 
3.3 Regression analysis
In the previous section, we looked at children’s production of embedded sentences in the 
Sentence Embedding task. In this section, we consider how children’s production of 
embedded sentences can be predicted by their scores on FB reasoning, reading ability and 
age. 
First, a linear regression analysis was performed with the production of double or 
mixed embeddings as dependent variable and with FB1-scores, FB2-scores, DMT/AVI and 
age as explanatory variables. We combined double and mixed embedding because they both 
express recursive propositions (e.g., beliefs about beliefs). Furthermore, due to the 
collinearity between the two reading ability scores (DMT and AVI; r(53)=0.87, p<.001), one 
combined measure for reading ability was used (DMT/AVI). The model explained 40.2% of 
variance in the production of double/mixed embeddings (F(4,54)=8.39, p<0.001).ii Table 4 
presents the standardized coefficients, showing that double/mixed embeddings are predicted 
by children’s performance on the second-order FB questions β=0.52, t(54)=4.23, p<.001. The 
effect of reading ability failed to reach significance. FB1-score and age were no significant 
predictors for the production of double/mixed embeddings either. 
Table 4. Linear regression model for predicting double/mixed embeddings from FB1-score, 
FB2-score, AVI/DMT and age
Predictor Beta T Sig. 
FB1-score 0.015 0.136 0.893
FB2-score 0.52** 4.23 0.000
DMT/AVI 0.217 1.83 0.073
Age (years) 0.075 0.595 0.555
Note. **p<.001
Second, a linear regression analysis was performed with the production of single embeddings 
as dependent variable and with the FB1-scores, FB2-scores, DMT/AVI and age as 
explanatory variables. The model explained 32.1% of variance in the production of single 
embeddings (F(4,54)=5.913, p<0.001). Table 5 presents the standardized coefficients, 
showing that the proportion of correct FB1-answers failed to significantly predict the 
proportion of single embeddings, but that both a better reading level (β=-0.35, t(54)=-2.74, 
p<.01) and a higher rate of correct FB2-answers (β=-0.35, t(54)=-2.71, p<.01) were equally 
predictive of a lower rate of single embeddings. Age was no significant predictor for the 
production of single embeddings. 
Table 5. Linear regression model for predicting single embeddings from FB1-score, FB2-
score, AVI/DMT and age
Predictor Beta T Sig. 
FB1-score 0.22 1.80 0.078
FB2-score -0.35* -2.71 0.009
DMT/AVI -0.35* -2.74 0.008
Age (years) -0.029 -0.22 0.827
Note. *p<.01
   
4. Discussion
This study aimed to investigate the relation between children’s production of double sentence 
embedding and second-order FB reasoning. The hypothesis tested is an extension of the 
language-first hypothesis by De Villiers and colleagues (e.g., De Villiers and Pyers, 2002), 
which holds that the acquisition of the syntax of embedded complements under mental-state 
verbs is a prerequisite for the development of first-order ToM. Extending this hypothesis, we 
wanted to know whether the ability to produce double embeddings is related to, and perhaps 
even required for, the mastery of second-order FB reasoning. 
Our study shows first of all that second-order FB reasoning is still under construction 
in middle childhood. The children in our study (aged 7 to 10) performed at ceiling on the 
first-order FB questions, but still experienced difficulties with second-order FB reasoning. 
In our elicited production task, children produced a considerable number  of single 
and double embeddings. Their production of double embeddings was found to be related to 
second-order FB reasoning in particular. First, children’s production of double embeddings 
was explained by their second-order FB performance, but not by their first-order FB 
performance, reading abilities or age. Second, children with different FB abilities showed 
different patterns of production of sentence embedding; only the children who mastered 
second-order FB understanding had a preference for producing double embeddings. 
These results indicate that the ability to produce double embeddings and the ability of 
second-order FB reasoning are related in children. However, our study does not provide 
evidence that the ability to produce double embeddings is a prerequisite for second-order FB 
reasoning. Rather, the relation between double embeddings and complex FB reasoning in our 
study is not unique and exclusive. Double embeddings were produced by children at all levels 
of FB mastery, also by children who failed on the FB1 and FB2 questions. Furthermore, 
children who mastered second-order FB understanding did not mainly produce double 
embeddings; rather, they did so only 58% of the time and also produced a substantial number 
of mixed and single embeddings. As the Sentence Embedding task was feasible even for the 
youngest children, the children who produced single embeddings in this task likely had 
difficulty producing double embeddings. If so, this would suggest that the ability to produce 
double embeddings is not a prerequisite for second-order FB reasoning and hence that our 
results go against the language-first hypothesis for recursive ToM. 
Our production task also revealed an unexpected strategy in children. Some children 
produced mixed embeddings, that preserved the complexity of mental-state embedding while 
avoiding the syntactic complexity of double sentence embedding. These mixed embeddings 
contain direct speech reports, which require less cognitive effort to produce than indirect 
speech reports (Groenewold, Bastiaanse, Nickels, Wieling and Huiskes 2014). This strategy 
of producing simpler mixed sentence embeddings for representing complex mental-state 
embeddings could be taken to indicate that the children are capable of second-order ToM, but 
still have difficulty representing this complexity in language by means of sentential 
complementation, which would again go against the language-first hypothesis for recursive 
ToM. However, perhaps the mental-state embeddings represented in the visual stimuli 
available to the child need not be represented mentally by the child. It is conceivable that the 
children producing mixed embeddings did so by step-wise verbalizing the mental states 
visible in the picture. Nevertheless, these mixed embeddings seem typical for children and 
may be a rite de passage towards producing full-blown double embeddings. However, 
confirmation of this suggestion requires further study. 
Overall, the children in our study produced a large number  of single embeddings. 
Many of these were produced by children capable of first-order but not second-order FB 
reasoning. This confirms the hypothesized relation between the mastery of single sentence 
embedding and first-order ToM. The finding that mastery of first-order FB understanding did 
not predict single embedding could be due to the children’s ceiling level performance on 
first-order FB. An alternative explanation for the large number of single embeddings could be 
that the children were trained on producing single embeddings during the practice session. 
However, all children remarked at the start of the test session that the pictures had changed, 
and this was also explicitly mentioned by the experimenter. It is therefore unlikely that the 
children did not produce double embeddings because they failed to see that the pictures had 
changed. 
This study is a first step into investigating the relation between complex language and 
complex thought. It reveals that there is a relation between the production of double 
embeddings and mastery of second-order FB reasoning. Future studies, investigating the 
longitudinal development of language and Theory of Mind, should uncover the exact 
direction of this relation. 
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